We estimate a New Keynesian wage Phillips curve for a panel of 24 OECD countries, and allow the degree of wage indexation to past in ‡ation to vary according to the monetary policy regime. We …nd that the extent of wage indexation is signi…cantly lower in an in ‡ation targeting regime, in contrast to monetary targeting, exchange rate targeting and policy regimes without an explicit quantitative anchor. The results put into question whether embedding a constant degree of wage indexation in standard DSGE models is truly structural.
Introduction
New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models typically assume sticky wages and partial wage indexation to past in ‡ation. Notably, the degree to which wages are indexed to past in ‡ation is hard-wired as a …xed and policy invariant parameter (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 2005, Smets and Wouters 2007) . The assumption of a constant degree of wage indexation, however, has been rejected by institutional and empirical evidence for the United States (US). In particular, Holland (1986) documents a substantial rise in the proportion of wage contracts with indexation clauses to price level changes in the US between the late 1960s and mid 1980s, after which there was again a decline. Hofmann, Peersman and Straub (2012) estimate the extent of wage indexation in the US over time, and …nd a considerably higher degree of indexation during the "Great In ‡ation" of the 1970s compared to the earlier and later periods. Holland (1986) attributes the rise of indexation practices in the 1970s to much higher in ‡ation uncertainty, whereas Hofmann et al. (2012) explain the rise and fall of wage indexation by a weaker reaction of the Federal Reserve to in ‡ation during the "Great In ‡ation" and more aggressive in ‡ation stabilization before and after this period. Speci…cally, a weakly in ‡ation stabilizing monetary policy regime is conducive to high and volatile in ‡ation, which fosters the use of wage indexation clauses as protection against in ‡ation uncertainty.
To the extent that in ‡ation uncertainty is determined by the monetary policy regime, a possible link between the degree of wage indexation and monetary policy is supported by economic theory. Gray (1978) , for example, shows in a neoclassical model with wage rigidities that the optimal proportion of wage contracts indexed to in ‡ation increases with the variance of monetary disturbances. Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1983) further show in an e¢ cient contract model that the gain of indexation for risk averse workers, and hence the likelihood of indexation, rises when in ‡ation uncertainty is higher. On the other hand, Carrillo, Peersman and Wauters (2014) demonstrate that utility maximizing workers only want to index wages to past in ‡ation when permanent shocks to the in ‡ation target (and technology) dominate output ‡uctuations, but not when temporal in ‡ation target (and aggregate demand) shocks dominate.
In this paper, we formally examine whether wage indexation varies across monetary policy regimes. 1 More precisely, we estimate the reduced-form empirical New Keynesian wage Phillips curve of Galí (2011) on a panel dataset covering 24 OECD countries between 1960Q1 and 2011Q4, and allow the degree of wage indexation to vary according to the monetary policy regime. Since the monetary policy regime of an individual country is in general quite stable over time, a panel dataset approach increases the number of observations signi…cantly, which allows us to formally estimate the role of the policy regime. To control for the e¤ect of labour market institutions, we include the degree of labour market coordination and union density as additional possible explanatory variables.
We identify the monetary policy regime of a country in a speci…c period based on the presence of an explicit quantitative monetary target, which takes three forms: in ‡ation, money growth and exchange rates targets. Quantitative targets are transparent policy indicators and can easily be measured. 2 A formal commitment to a quantitative target is expected to in ‡uence (improve) the formation of in ‡ation expectations and (reduce) in ‡ation uncertainty of workers (Mishkin 2007) . We distinguish between the presence of an in ‡ation, money growth and exchange rate target, because the underlying dynamics of these strategies and formation of in ‡ation expectations are inherently di¤erent. For example, in ‡ation targeting central banks typically try to stabilize in ‡ation in the short to medium term, whereas money growth targeting is more a commitment to low in ‡ation in the long run. 3 The estimation results provide a number of important considerations for macroeconomic analysis and policymakers. First, we …nd that wage indexation is signi…cant and economically relevant for the sample under analysis. Second, the results con…rm that wage indexation varies across monetary policy regimes. The degree of wage indexation to past in ‡ation turns out to be signi…cantly lower in a regime which has a quantitative in ‡ation target but this condition does not hold for money growth or exchange rate targets. Since the extent of wage indexation is di¤erent across monetary policy regimes, the constant indexation assumption embedded in standard DSGE models is susceptible to the Lucas (1976) critique, i.e. it is not intrinsic to the deep structure of the economy and not a policy invariant parameter. The analysis of alterations to the policy regime and counterfactual policy simulations in these models are thus potentially misleading. Similarly, the computation of optimal monetary policies that are conditional on the estimated parameters of these models may produce unreliable results if the optimal policy strategy implies changes to the degree of wage indexation and thus the structure of the economy.
Third, to the extent that having a quantitative in ‡ation target itself is the key mechanism that lowers wage indexation to past in ‡ation, the results suggest that the adoption of an explicit in ‡ation target could reduce the in ‡ationary consequences of shocks hitting the economy, the costs of disin ‡ation, and the volatility of output and prices. 4 Specifically, given that in ‡ation is driven by real marginal costs, which are directly linked to wages, a signi…cant reduction in the degree of wage indexation implies less ampli…cation of the in ‡ationary consequences of shocks hitting the economy due to mutually reinforc-2 There is a large literature that has focused on domestic institutions to represent the monetary policy regime, such as the degree of central bank independence and indicators of transparency (e.g. Alesina and Summers 1993 , Eij¢ nger and Geraats 2006 , Dincer and Eichengreen 2014 . The use of such indicators, however, would reduce our panel dataset considerably. Moreover, the construction of these indicators involves debatable personal judgment.
3 The in ‡ationary outcomes of the three di¤erent types of nominal anchors also turn out to be di¤erent (Fatás, Mihov and Rose 2007) . 4 Based on the estimations, we can only conclude that the degree of wage indexation is di¤erent across monetary policy regimes, and signi…cantly lower in regimes that have a quantitative in ‡ation target. Whether the in ‡ation target itself is the mechanism that reduces indexation practices is a question out of the scope of this paper. Speci…cally, other features of a monetary policy regime that are typically associated with an explicit in ‡ation target could reduce the degree of wage indexation, for instance enhanced transparency, more independent central banks or an in ‡ation averse society.
ing feedback e¤ects between wages and prices, i.e. less so-called second-round e¤ects of in ‡ationary shocks. A reduction in the in ‡ationary e¤ects of shocks hitting the economy requires in turn less aggressive monetary policy responses to stabilize in ‡ation, lowering also output volatility (Hofmann et al. 2012 ).
Our work is related to several strands in the literature. Messina and Sanz-de-Galdeano (2014) use micro level data to document how Brazil's and Uruguay's disin ‡ation policies changed the nature of wage rigidities. Alogoskou…s and Smith (1991) study wage and price in ‡ation series from 1892 to 1987 for the US and the UK; they report coinciding shifts in the wage Phillips curve and price in ‡ation persistence, which they link to departures from international …xed exchange rate regimes. Benati (2008) questions whether the intrinsic in ‡ation persistence found in post-WWII US data is truly structural. He estimates the price Phillips curve on historical data for a set of countries and …nds the price indexation parameter to be very low or zero under stable monetary policy regimes with clearly de…ned nominal anchors. Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004) …nd that in ‡ation expectations appear to be more forward looking, and in ‡ation less persistent, in in ‡ation targeting countries. A related study is also Fatás et al. (2007) , who …nd that having an explicit quantitative target for monetary policy, in particular an in ‡ation target, is systematically related to a lower average level of in ‡ation. Finally, our study is related to the literature that analyses the role of monetary policy institutions for in ‡ation outcomes and economic growth, such as central bank independence (Alesina and Summers 1993) and transparency (Sterne, Stasavage and Chortareas 2002 , Eij¢ nger and Geraats 2006 , Dincer and Eichengreen 2014 .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we present the estimation results for a benchmark wage Phillips curve model with a constant degree of wage indexation. In section 3, we extend the benchmark model to analyse the in ‡uence of the monetary policy regime on the extent of backward-looking wage indexation, while controlling for a set of labour market characteristics. Finally, section 4 concludes.
Wage Phillips curve with constant indexation
We …rst derive a benchmark empirical New Keynesian wage Phillips curve in section 2.1. Section 2.2 presents the data and discusses some econometric issues, and the estimation results are shown in section 2.3.
Model speci…cation
Our theoretical framework is based on Galí (2011) , who derives the empirical wage Phillips curve from a New Keynesian model that includes the unemployment rate. He derives both a theoretical foundation for the empirical relation and a structural interpretation of the reduced form coe¢ cients. The model assumes staggered wage setting as in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) , which means that a worker's wage cannot be re-optimized in every period. When the wage cannot be reset, it is assumed to be indexed to a weighted average of past price in ‡ation ( p t 1 ), the central bank's in ‡ation target ( ) and trend productivity growth (g): p t 1 + (1 ) + g, with parameter 2 (0; 1) determining the weights.
We denote wage in ‡ation by w t and the di¤erence between unemployment and the natural rate byû t u t u n . The model's solution is given by Galí 2011, eq. 19 ).
Bringing (1) to a panel data setting results in the econometric benchmark wage in ‡ation model:
where subscripts i and t indicate the country and time period, and i represents (1 ) i + g i ( 0 + 1 )u n i plus additional country speci…c and time-invariant e¤ects. Our main interest is the degree of indexation to past price in ‡ation ( ), which is expected to lie between 0 and 1.
Panel dataset and econometric considerations
Our sample consists of an unbalanced panel covering quarterly data between 1960Q1 and 2011Q4 for 24 OECD economies. 5 We use the information from a group of countries to broaden the information set and to increase the power of the tests. We consider the average hourly earnings of employees in the manufacturing sector as our measure of wages, sourced from the OECD MEI database. The earnings data are comparable to wage rate series that proxy for the basic wages or cost-of-living allowances, but they provide a more complete measure of the overall wage income because they also include premium pay for overtime and bonuses. 6 Our price measure is the quarterly all-items consumer price index. We construct quarter-on-quarter wage and price in ‡ation series as 100 times the log di¤erences of the wage and price indices. We follow Galí (2011) in taking the average of the 4-quarter lags of past in ‡ation as a smoothed price indexation measure. 7 The unemployment rate is expressed as a percentage of the total labour force. Appendix A provides further details on the coverage and data de…nitions.
There are two issues of panel estimation that we need to take into account. First, we have to verify the appropriateness of homogeneous regression parameters. When the regression does not contain lagged dependent variables, as in equation (2), and the estimators are strictly exogenous, both homogeneous and heterogeneous estimators deliver 5 The 24 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, South Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. 6 Compensation rates, which also include employer contributions to social security or social insurance schemes, are a widely used alternative measure. However, this series is not available for 10 of the 24 countries in our sample. 7 The main …ndings of this paper are robust to using past in ‡ation instead of the smoothed measure.
consistent coe¢ cient estimates (Pesaran and Smith 1995) . We nevertheless check whether the assumption of homogeneous parameters a¤ects our small sample coe¢ cient estimates by comparing Fixed E¤ects (FE) and Mean Group (MG) estimation results with a Wald test.
Second, macro panel estimates can be a¤ected by cross-sectional dependence in the errors. Such dependence generally indicates the in ‡uence of factors which are common across countries, but not explicitly modelled. To ensure consistent estimates, we apply the cross section dependence test (CD test) of Pesaran (2004) to the residuals of the equations (2) and (4). If the test indicates a signi…cant correlation between the cross section errors, we apply Common Correlated E¤ects (CCE) estimators. 8 Table 1 depicts the estimation results for the benchmark wage in ‡ation model (2) in columns 1 and 2. A test on the homogeneity assumption of the coe¢ cients validates the use of pooled estimators. 9 The FE estimation in column 1 indicates a substantial degree of wage indexation to past in ‡ation. The point estimate of is 0.81, which is within the estimated range of 0.52 and 0.83 obtained by Galí (2011) for the US. The negative contemporaneous and positive lagged e¤ect of unemployment is in line with theoretical expectations (Galí, 2011) . On impact, a 1 percentage point decline in the unemployment rate leads to a 0.37% increase in nominal wages. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are employed for consistent inference. All parameters are statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. The presence of a signi…cant cross-sectional correlation in the residuals according to the CD test (bottom of Table 1 ) results makes a case for CCE estimators. Adding the cross section averages (CSAs) as regressors decreases the average residual correlation, although it remains signi…cant (column 2). All coe¢ cients decline to around half their previous size, with the indexation coe¢ cient now attaining 0.41. Cogley and Sbordone (2008) argue that the price indexation parameter in a standard DSGE model becomes zero once a time-varying trend in ‡ation of the central bank is introduced. As a robustness check, we have therefore also extended the estimated benchmark wage in ‡ation model (2) with an estimated time-varying trend in ‡ation (see Appendix B). The results are, however, the same (also the ones reported in the next section). 8 The CCE estimators conveniently abstract from the possible in ‡uence of common factors by augmenting the observed regressors with the cross section averages (CSAs) of all variables, leaving least squares estimation still adequate. This approach yields consistent and asymptotically normal parameter estimates in a cross-country panel with a fairly large number of countries (Pesaran 2006) . 9 We performed the empirical analysis in STATA 12 with the user-written xtcd and xtmg routines of Eberhardt (2012) . A Wald test on the null of coe¢ cient homogeneity of FE versus MG generates an insigni…cant chi-square test statistic of 3.88. The Wald test on the CCE pooled and MG estimates also cannot reject the null of homogeneity (the test statistic is 2.36). 3 Wage Phillips curve with variable wage indexation
Results

Linking wage indexation to monetary policy
A number of theoretical studies conclude that the degree of wage indexation to past in ‡a-tion may depend on in ‡ation uncertainty and the conduct of monetary policy. Speci…cally, Gray (1978) presents a neoclassical model with short-term wage rigidities and uncertainty, and shows that the degree of wage indexation that minimizes the deviation of output from full-information output increases with the variability of monetary disturbances. Ehrenberg et al. (1983) demonstrate in an e¢ cient contract model that a rise in in ‡ation uncertainty may lead to greater use of wage indexation because wage indexation helps to insulate the worker's real wage from the e¤ects of unanticipated in ‡ation, whereas it reduces the impact of lower-than-anticipated in ‡ation on the real cost of labour inputs for …rms. Carrillo et al. (2014) show that utility maximizing wage setters raise the extent of wage indexation to past in ‡ation when the variability of permanent shocks to the in ‡ation target of the central bank increases, whereas the amount of indexation declines when there is a rise in the volatility of temporal in ‡ation target shocks.
A possible link between wage indexation, in ‡ation uncertainty and monetary policy is also supported by institutional and empirical evidence for the US. Holland (1986) demonstrates that the proportion of cost-of-living adjustment clauses in major collective bargaining agreements was much higher in the 1970s and …rst half of the 1980s than the preceding and subsequent periods. He …nds that this pattern can be explained by a sizeable increase of in ‡ation uncertainty in the 1970s, measured by the mean squared forecast error of in ‡ation surveys. Hofmann et al. (2012) estimate the evolution of US wage dynamics over time, and …nd a degree of wage indexation to past in ‡ation of 0.91 during the "Great In ‡ation" of the 1970s, compared to 0.30 and 0.17 before and after this period. 10 Hofmann et al. (2012) argue that this evolution can be explained by a shift in the monetary policy reaction function of the Federal Reserve. More speci…cally, a weakly in ‡ation stabilizing conduct of monetary policy in the 1970s resulted in high and volatile in ‡ation, which encouraged the use of indexation clauses in wage contracts as a protection against in ‡ation uncertainty. Conversely, the credible establishment of price stability after the disin ‡ation of the early 1980s reduced the need for protection against unforeseen in ‡ation, thus mitigating wage indexation. 11
Both theory and empirical evidence thus suggest that the assumption of a constant degree of wage indexation in a wage Phillips curve is questionable. However, although the degree of wage indexation in the US was de…nitely higher during the "Great In ‡ation" compared to earlier and later periods, it is not clear whether this was indeed the consequence of monetary policy. For example, the 1970s were also characterized by very volatile supply shocks, whilst changes in labour market institutions may also have played a role. It is also not clear whether a link between indexation and the conduct of monetary policy can be established in other countries. In the rest of this paper, we formally examine the in ‡uence of the monetary policy regime on wage indexation within our panel dataset of 24 OECD countries.
Characteristics of Monetary policy regimes
We identify the monetary policy regime by the presence of an explicit quantitative monetary target. It is commonly accepted that a policy regime that clearly commits to a nominal anchor can help promote price stability and stabilize in ‡ation expectations (Mishkin 2007) . A quantitative monetary target should help to lower in ‡ation uncertainty. Accordingly, also the degree of wage indexation is expected to be lower in a monetary policy regime with an explicit nominal anchor. The advantage of de…ning a policy regime by the presence of a quantitative target is that it can easily be measured and veri…ed in an objective and mechanistic way (Fatás et al. 2007 ).
There exist di¤erent types of nominal anchors, and in this work, we consider three di¤erent monetary target strategies: the in ‡ation rate, the exchange rate and the money supply. These three frameworks have distinct characteristics. Under in ‡ation targeting, policy decisions are based on conditional medium-run in ‡ation forecasts. Its high degree of transparency and accountability further allows for close monitoring by the private sector (Svensson 1999) . A …xed exchange rate target is also easily communicated to the public, but monetary policy cannot react to domestic shocks independently from the anchor country. This restriction makes the …xed exchange rate vulnerable to speculative attacks, which increases in ‡ation uncertainty. Money growth targeting also o¤ers a transparent anchor to the public, but this strategy should be seen primarily as a way to communicate a commitment to low and stable in ‡ation in the long run (Issing 1996) . Targeting a money aggregate can lead to more in ‡ation uncertainty in the short to medium term due to the unstable relationship between in ‡ation and money aggregates and the presence of money demand shocks. 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 
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This distinction is also validated by the empirical literature analysing the macroeconomic outcomes of di¤erent monetary regimes. Fatás et al. (2007) , for instance, …nd that an in ‡ation targeting regime lowers in ‡ation signi…cantly more than an exchange rate or a monetary targeting regime. Furthermore, in ‡ation targeting has anchored in ‡ation expectations (Walsh 2009 ) and lowered in ‡ation persistence (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2007) . 12 Fixed exchange rate regimes have in some cases been linked to greater output volatility and lower and more stable in ‡ation (Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf 1997; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2001) . Monetary target regimes have been found to keep in ‡ation under control in the longer run by means of a ‡exible approach towards the target rule and an active and elaborate communication of the monetary policy strategy to the public (Mishkin 1999) . Figure 1 summarizes the evolution of the monetary regimes for the countries in our sample. The overall pattern is consistent with the shifts in policy regimes documented in the literature (Fatás et al. 2007) . Exchange rate targeting was the dominant regime during the 1960s and early 1970s, while in the mid-1970s some countries shifted to monetary targeting. 13 Since the early 1990s, a lot of countries switched to in ‡ation targeting, which becomes the dominant policy framework at the end of the sample. We classify EMU members as having both an in ‡ation and a monetary target since the emergence of the European Central Bank in 1999, which is why the series jump at this point. Notice that the total number of regimes increases over time and always exceeds the number of countries. This can be explained by a declining trend in the number of countries without a formal target and countries combining di¤erent targets. Table 2 shows that there are 55 of regime switches in total. 14 We conclude that there is quite some variation in the data in terms of policy regime shifts. 
Econometric model speci…cation
We explore whether the degree of wage indexation varies according to the monetary policy regime, by extending the benchmark wage Phillips curve of section 2 with interaction terms:
where d i;t (regime i;t ; ud i;t ; coord i;t ) 0 1 3 Exchange rate frameworks characterized as a managed or free ‡oat are not considered as an exchange rate targeting regime.
1 4 Of the 55 cases, only 6 cases are "double counted" because a country with one target switched to a regime with 2 other targets, and vice versa. If we also include cases where there is a change in the policy regime without abandoning the regime already in place (including cases where, for instance, a monetary targeter adds an in ‡ation target as second objective), we obtain a total of 70 regime changes. D i;t is a k 1 vector of variables that are interacted with past in ‡ation and the constant i , whereas e and e are k 1 vectors with the corresponding interaction coe¢ cients. 15 Following Fatás et al. (2007) , we asses whether having a monetary target matters in the …rst place, and distinguish between the type of target in a second step. 16 The policy regime interaction dummies (regime) therefore indicate the presence of an explicit quantitative monetary target (target), or respectively an in ‡ation target (it), a money growth target (mon) or an exchange rate target (er).
We control for possible e¤ects of changes in the wage bargaining process on indexation by including the coordination level of wage bargaining (coord) and the union density rate (ud) in the estimations. Cecchetti (1987) , for instance, documents that policy interventions in the bargaining process in the US during the 1960s and early 1970s altered both the e¤ective degree of indexation and the frequency of union wage changes. Recent empirical evidence of Gnocchi and Pappa (2013) shows that wage bargaining reforms that reduced the centralization of wage bargaining have led to changes in wage dynamics. Messina and Sanz-de-Galdeano (2014) relate the di¤erent evolution of wage indexation in Uruguay and Brazil to the dynamics in the centralization level of wage bargaining and changes in the union coverage. The authors …nd that a decline in union coverage and a more decentralized wage bargaining reduces wage indexation. Carrillo et al. (2014) further show that the economy's equilibrium degree of wage indexation can di¤er depending on whether the labour market coordination is centralized or decentralized.
We use the coordination level of wage bargaining to capture the degree to which major institutional players' decisions extend to lower-level institutions and the percentage of workers that are a¢ liated with a labour union to control for the power of labour unions in wage bargaining negotiations. The coordination variable ranges from 1 (decentralized) to 5 (highly centralized), while the union density rate is expressed as a percentage. Figure 2 shows the evolution over time in the coordination measure for the countries in our sample. The proxy varies strongly across countries and time, and there is also a di¤erence in the extent of time variation across countries (compare, e.g., Norway to the US). The same message holds for the union density rate, depicted in …gure 3, although most countries seem to experience a downward or stable trend over time.
Results
We now discuss the estimation results of the wage Phillips curve with interaction variables, for which we only report FE estimates. In contrast to the benchmark model, the CCEP estimator is not suitable for the interaction e¤ects model. The reason for this limitation is explained in table 3, which gives an overview of the mean and median correlation 1980q1  1990q1  2000q1  2010q1  1960q1  1970q1  1980q1  1990q1  2000q1  2010q1  1960q1  1970q1  1980q1  1990q1  2000q1  2010q1  1960q1  1970q1  1980q1  1990q1  2000q1  2010q1  1960q1  1970q1  1980q1  1990q1  2000q1  2010q1  1960q1  1970q1  1980q1  1990q1 1960q1  1970q1  1980q1  1990q1  2000q1  2010q1  1960q1  1970q1  1980q1  1990q1  2000q1  2010q1  1960q1  1970q1  1980q1  1990q1  2000q1  2010q1  1960q1  1970q1  1980q1  1990q1  2000q1  2010q1  1960q1  1970q1  1980q1  1990q1  2000q1  2010q1  1960q1  1970q1  1980q1  1990q1  2000q1  2010q1   AUS  AUT  BEL  CAN  CZE  DEN   EST  FIN  FRA  GER  HUN  IRE   ITA  KOR  NET  NOR  NZ  POL POR SLK SPA SWE UK US Figure 3 : Union density rate of the country-speci…c regime and labour market indicators with their respective CSA for the entire group of countries. The correlations are quite high, up to 90% and more for the in ‡ation target dummy, which indicates that changes in the interaction variables are synchronized in time across countries. This result makes controlling for their CSAs unattractive, as they will interfere with our goal of measuring the in ‡uence of the policy regime on . In addition, we found that including the CSAs of the other (non-interacted) variables does not lead to further important reductions in the extent of cross-sectional residual correlation. We have therefore decided not to apply the CCE estimators for the estimation of the interaction model. Table 4 reports the estimates of equation (3) with the monetary regime interaction variables. At the bottom of the table, we report the average degree of indexation in each regime. 17 The …rst column indicates that monetary policy regimes with a quantitative monetary target, irrespective of the type of target, have a degree of wage indexation to past in ‡ation which is on average not signi…cantly lower than regimes without a quantitative target.
A closer look at the e¤ect of an in ‡ation, money growth or exchange rate target, provided in column 2, shows that the type of target matters. Speci…cally, the degree of wage indexation is on average 0.60 lower in policy regimes that have an explicit in ‡ation target. With the labour market variables set to their sample means, wage indexation to past in ‡ation is even statistically insigni…cant for countries with a quantitative in ‡ation target. In contrast, a money growth or exchange rate target has no substantial e¤ect on the degree of indexation. 18 The estimated degree of wage indexation for both regimes is respectively 0.82 and 0.73. Finally, the level of coordination and the union density rate exert no signi…cant in ‡uence on . 19 In sum, only the presence of an explicit in ‡ation target seems to reduce the extent of wage indexation in OECD countries. 1 8 The substantial reduction of indexation under in ‡ation targeting is robust to using the …rst or fourth lag of the regime dummies. The e¤ect is also robust to including a time-varying in ‡ation target. These results are available from the authors on request.
1 9 We also tested for a possible non-linear relationship of the extent of coord and ud on wage indexation in the spirit of Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) , but the quadratic e¤ects were found to be statistically insigni…cant. 
Conclusions
We have examined the standard assumption in New Keynesian DSGE models that wage indexation to past price in ‡ation is invariant to policy regimes. In particular, we have estimated the reduced form empirical wage Phillips curve of Galí (2011) with a panel model for 24 advanced economies, and allowed the degree of backward-looking wage indexation to vary according to the monetary policy regime while controlling for the evolution of labour market institutions.
We …nd that wage indexation to past in ‡ation varies across monetary policy regimes. Speci…cally, the degree of wage indexation in an in ‡ation target regime is both statistically insigni…cant and signi…cantly lower than indexation in a regime without a target. In contrast, regimes with money and exchange rate targets have statistically signi…cant indexation levels, and these levels are not signi…cantly di¤erent from a regime without any formal quantitative target. These di¤erences could be due to varying strengths of the nominal anchor under the di¤erent frameworks, as in ‡ation targeting has been found to establish better anchored in ‡ation expectations Schmidt-Hebbel 2007, Walsh 2009 ), which, in turn, could strengthen the nominal anchor.
Overall, our results question the structural nature of hard-wiring a …xed degree of wage indexation in standard DSGE models. Our work corroborates and extends the …nding of Hofmann et al. (2012) of substantial time variation in the degree of wage indexation for the US. It further shows that the monetary policy dependence of price indexation found by Benati (2008) can be extended to wage indexation. From a policy standpoint, our …ndings suggest that counterfactual policy simulations and the analysis of optimal monetary policy based on modern macroeconomic models are potentially misleading.
Our work provides empirical support for research that aims to endogenise the extent of wage indexation in structural models. Some steps have already been taken by Wieland (2009) and Carrillo et al. (2014) , but further research in this direction is warranted.
Trade union density: the trade union density rate is de…ned as the ratio of the number of wage and salary earners that are trade union members to the total number of wage and salary earners [OECD, Labour statistics, annual frequency, 1960 -2011 .
Trend in ‡ation: for each country, we estimate trend in ‡ation with the AR-Trendbound model of Chan et al. (2013) (see appendix B) . The model delivers estimates of a central bank's time-varying in ‡ation target, which is restricted to lie within bounds, based on di¤use uniform priors. We estimate the model using Bayesian MCMC methods, as detailed in Chan et al. (2013) , and we drew 55,000 samples and discarded the …rst 5,000 as burn-in. The results are available upon request. For each country, we keep the median draws from the distribution of trend in ‡ation in order to detrend wage and price in ‡ation, as given in (4). Table 7 shows the results from table 1 in the …rst two columns, and columns 3 and 4 show the results for the constant indexation model with time-varying trend in ‡ation. We …nd that wage indexation to past in ‡ation remains statistically signi…cant in the extended model with trend in ‡ation, although the FE indexation parameter declines in magnitude. The results for the interaction model with time-varying trend in ‡ation (not shown) indicate that our …nding of lower and statistically insigni…cant wage indexation under in ‡ation targeting remains robust. 24 Table 6 : Uniform prior settings for the trend-in ‡ation bounds Note: , , denote signi…cance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets Sample: T =141, max T =207, min T =47 and N=24
